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Review Essay
Wittgenstein
The Fate of Wonder Wittgenstein’s Critique of
Metaphysics and Modernity
Kevin M. Cahill. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
272pp.

David A. White*
That Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was one of the most influential twentiethcentury philosophers is hardly a controversial claim. However, Wittgenstein’s own works,
principally the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) and Philosophical Investigations
(1953; second edition 1997), have engendered a considerable range of widely diverse—
and divisive—commentary. In The Fate of Wonder Wittgenstein’s Critique of
Metaphysics and Modernity, Kevin M. Cahill has produced a useful and at times
provocative addition to this literature.

I
The Fate of Wonder opens with an introduction followed by two parts (chapters 1–3, 4–
6). At the beginning of the Introduction, Cahill states (2) the book’s three main ideas:
Wittgenstein intended to “reawaken the sense of wonder for what he felt was the
deeply mysterious place of human life in the world;” this “task could only be carried
through as a form of cultural criticism”—in particular, “Wittgenstein’s critical
*
David A. White has a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Toronto and teaches in the Department
of Philosophy at DePaul University. He received a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies to
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relation to Western metaphysics must be understood in its critical relation to
Western modernity;” and finally, “only a way of practicing philosophy that both
avoided and undermined traditional philosophy’s reliance on theory was suited to
accomplish this task.” Cahill insists that Wittgenstein’s work is suffused with an
ethical dimension, a concern (3) “best understood as modulated by a critique of
metaphysics-cum-critique of culture, all moving through his concern for the fate of
wonder” (Cahill admits that this cultural significance must be “teased out” of
Wittgenstein’s texts–174n21.) In addition, Cahill clarifies his approach to the standard
separation of Wittgenstein’s work into “early” and “late,” and describes his own
methodology regarding the diverse texts comprising Wittgenstein’s output. Cahill
also announces his intention to confront key aspects of Wittgenstein with elements of
Heidegger’s early (and seminal) Being and Time (1927) employed as a prism to enhance
Cahill’s line of interpretation. The introduction concludes with an overview of the book;
the rest of part I of this review amplifies this outline.
Chapter 1 analyzes the two major interpretive approaches to reading the
Tractatus—the “ineffabilist” vs. “the resolute;” Cahill offers reasons for preferring the
latter, i.e., that the Tractatus resolutely avoids advancing substantive philosophical
positions, whether about language or anything else. Cahill also announces a theme
pervading his approach (31): “One significant consequence of this interpretation is
that after we throw away Wittgenstein’s nonsensical elucidations, the only sentences
remaining are those that can be used to say something: ordinary sentences” (italics in text).
We shall see (part II below) that to determine the precise content of an “ordinary sentence”
becomes crucial to the cogency of Cahill’s overall interpretation.
Chapter 2, the longest and “most ambitious” chapter in the book (12),
articulates the ethical purpose of the Tractatus. Given “Wittgenstein’s understanding
and practice of philosophy as an activity whose goal is clarity rather than the
establishment of philosophical truth or the refutation of philosophical theories” (42),
Cahill contends “that the ethical point of the Tractatus is to reawaken us to a sense of
wonder...” (44). Cahill introduces and explicates several pivotal distinctions Martin
Heidegger uses (in order to pursue “fundamental ontology”) toward the beginning of
Being and Time; Cahill’s strategy with this apparently inapt interpretive move is
comparative and explanatory: “Wittgenstein’s attempt in the Tractatus to clarify
language and the impulse to go beyond its limits and Heidegger’s attempt in Being and
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Time to uncover anxiety as a source of understanding into Dasein’s fundamental
structure ought to be seen as serving what are in central respects the same
philosophical end” (62). Chapter 2 also develops Cahill’s claim that of particular
significance regarding the sources of confusion in philosophy was what Wittgenstein
“saw as the distorting effect that causal-scientific modes of thought exerted on our
understanding both in philosophy and in the broader intellectual and spiritual life of
the West” (51). Wittgenstein had nothing against scientific practices per se
(cf.186n48); thus “there is nothing in the content of modern science itself that is
incompatible with wonder but...something about the cultural climate in which science
takes place blocks a reawakening to wonder” (57)—hence the need for a “cultural
critique” in order to disclose the possibility of such wonder. Chapter 2 concludes:
“Given his understanding of the nature of philosophical activity at the time he
completed the Tractatus, the removal of the obstacle of speculative philosophy is all,
I believe, he thought philosophy itself could achieve” (87).
These positive effects are complemented by the fact that, as Cahill argues in
chapter 3, the Tractatus fails in its stated goal to establish philosophically a program to
produce a uniform sense of clarity in the expression of language: “Using some of
Wittgenstein’s own later criticisms of his early work, I show that the failure here is due
to

a

fundamentally

metaphysical,

essentialist

view

of

language

that

inadvertently underlies the method of clarification that the Tractatus employs.” In fact,
“the Tractatus can be seen as an example of the very ‘craving for generality’ and
‘contemptuous attitude towards the particular case’ in philosophy that Wittgenstein
would later bemoan” (97).
The initial chapter of the second part, c hapter 4, is titled “The Concept of
Progress in Wittgenstein’s Thought” and its central strategy is to show how the
motto to the Philosophical Investigations makes the reader aware that reflection on
the concept of progress “is relevant for grasping some of [the book’s] central
philosophical objectives” (14). Cahill concedes that the theme of wonder cannot be found
as such in the Investigations but he insists nonetheless that close reading shows “how
something essentially preliminary to wonder can be located in the Investigations”
(138—italics in text; this is one element in the “teasing out” process of
interpretation noted at 174n21).

This propaedeutic involves demonstrating “how

the remarks on rule-following [as asserted in the Investigations] can be taken as an
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example of how the Philosophical Investigations attempts to lead the reader to a
perspective on language that then prepares the way for a distinctive kind of cultural
critique” (108). Cahill draws a sharp distinction between (a) rules as examined by
reflective, systematic philosophy and (b) rules when actually implemented within the
fabric of life: “The relevant difference between how rules show up for us when we are
engaged in following them is that in the former case it may be true to say that there
is always a question whether someone understands, while in the latter case, in ordinary
life, that is, there is usually no question at all” (119).
This separation of life as lived from life as the object of traditional
philosophical reflection and analysis is crucial to Cahill’s approach to the
Philosophical Investigations: “I want to make it plausible to think that Wittgenstein’s
engagement with this peculiar way of [compartmentalized] thinking is in large measure
intended as a philosophical response to what he takes to be one of the central
organizing myths of modernity, what Charles Taylor has called the ‘rationalist’ or
‘ disengaged’ view of human intelligence” (114). Cahill consolidates the import of the
Philosophical Investigations regarding this response: “Wittgenstein’s work of
assembling reminders (§27) in the Investigations is intended to help us to look (§66) at
the multitude of ways in which our expressions find their place in our given form of
life (§23) on the occasions of our various philosophical difficulties” (121).
Chapter 5 derives its title, “The Truly Apocalyptic View,” from a passage in
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass (Cahill’s translation): “The truly apocalyptic view of the world is
that things do not repeat themselves” (126—italics in text); it may be noted as an aside
that this thought is as metaphysical in content as many of the surviving fragments from
Heraclitus. Cahill then tersely states his intent: “In this chapter, I try to assess the relation
of Wittgenstein’s cultural concerns to his engagement with metaphysics, in particular
with the conception of rationality underlying the view of rules as rails” (127). Cahill
attempts to show how the Investigations can be read as substantially continuous with the
Tractatus, “both in the way it attempts to embody a nontheoretical conception of
philosophy” as well as “to fulfill the earlier work’s ethical purpose” (14).
The core of Cahill’s position regarding the artificiality of rules for practices
and linguistic usage is that human beings are necessarily living and functioning within
diversified contexts which are basically already determined. From this principle,
Cahill draws a conclusion with crucial consequences for the relation between
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language and metaphysics: “to talk of normal human life as already shaped by meaning
and understanding is also to imply the existence of the world in which that normal human
life is lived, a world without which there can be no talk of normal human life, a world
that (normally) neither forces its meanings on us (realism) nor on which we force
our meaning (antirealism)” (140—italics in text). Cahill has explicitly introduced “the
existence of the world” but the claim as stated deftly straddles whether this world
should

be

understood

according

to

realist

or

“antirealist”

metaphysical

characterizations.
An additional inference: “A mark of Wittgenstein’s later thought, then, is
the idea that ‘ authentic’ clarity in philosophy is inseparable from our acceptance that
the meaning of our words is in a certain sense dependent on what shows up as
mattering to us. (And a major goal of his later writing is to find a way of making
this acceptance as intellectually palatable as possible.)” Furthermore, and more
generally stated, “success in this project assumes that at any time a culture has enough
(and how many is enough is probably impossible to tell) members who can learn and
assimilate the virtues required to respond to and articulate what matters to its members in
a way that matters” (141). In short, what matters to a given culture is what has
forcefully impressed a certain number of speakers of language within that culture—at this
juncture Cahill provides no other criterion to justify “what matters” and its foundational
consequences for language as an expression of life and its varied concerns. Chapter 5
concludes with brief discussions of Wittgenstein on religion and on political
conservatism in response to commentators who have advanced positions concerning
these aspects of Wittgenstein’s overall output.
Chapter 6, “The Fate of Metaphysics,” concludes the work. The history
of western metaphysics is complex but Cahill feels justified in asserting claims such
as the following: “the craving for explanation of a non-naturalist sort by rationalists
such as Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, or Frege is closer in spirit to modern naturalism
than one might suspect; rationalists no less than modern naturalists accept a certain
dichotomous view of nature and rationality that, if [John] McDowell is correct in
Mind and World, is one of the central targets of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy”
(154). In an endnote (171n3), Cahill comments that Wittgenstein occasionally fell prey
to precisely the philosophical excesses which his work intended to reveal and explode; in
that vein, however, “Wittgenstein’s occasionally avowed sympathy with some
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of the impulses to metaphysics does not mitigate his overall hostility to theory in
philosophy;” for Cahill, it is difficult “to imagine his thinking that any resting place
could be found in, say, Berkeley or Leibniz, in whose thought the perverse role of theory
that began with Plato already exerts a decisive influence” (165).
The tenor of such observations regarding the “perverse role of theory” and its
dominance within the history of philosophy might lead one to dismiss philosophy
altogether, especially in the guises of its traditionally most influential moments and
figures. But Cahill hesitates in maintaining such a blanket rejection: “What
philosophers say and write does exert some influence on the shape of our intellectual
culture, and our intellectual culture, in turn, does exert some influence on how people
live. If, just to take one example, philosophers abandoned metaphysics cum
scientific naturalism, they might at the very least stop contributing to problems
associated with that view, problems, for example, connected to certain reductive views
of persons still prevalent in fields that affect the lives of many people” (167—all italics
in text). Whether Cahill must necessarily have a certain theoretical picture of the
nature of “persons” clearly in mind in order to assert this criticism of “certain reductive
views of persons” (my italics) prevalent on the current philosophical scene is not
discussed. Be that as it may, after extended critiques of John McDowell and Stanley
Cavell on Wittgenstein’s conjectures concerning the relation between human nature and
metaphysics, Cahill concludes the chapter, and the work, with this proposition:
“Whether Wittgenstein had any definite vision of how a new way of life and thought
might establish itself in the West, there seems little doubt that a hope for a
fundamental change in our current way of life informed both his philosophical
work and his spiritual life” (169).
A summary impression: Kevin M. Cahill’s book exhibits informed awareness
of the letter of Wittgenstein’s texts, including a number of entries from the Nachlass
which may not be familiar to a general philosophical audience. Cahill also integrates
and discusses within the fabric of his interpretation extensive passages from many
of the most influential recent commentators on Wittgenstein. In these respects, the
book is praiseworthy. However, I should mention here two procedural points
regarding the execution of the book: first, at the beginning of the preface (xi), Cahill
advises the reader that “many long endnotes” contain “much useful information”
and he invites the reader to attend to this material. The endnotes run from 171 to 230
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and if the reader is conscientious in following Cahill’s request, there will be extensive
flipping back and forth from the text proper to this material. If a third of these notes had
either been eliminated or incorporated into the narrative flow of the book (e.g., 201–
3n156, an almost three-page summary registering Cahill’s disagreements with James
Conant concerning Kierkegaard), it is difficult to believe that the argumentative
integrity of the book would have been weakened in any way—the work’s quotient of
“useful information” would thereby perhaps be reduced but the tradeoff in reduction of
potential loss of continuity would surely be justified. Cahill’s text concludes on
169—relatively brief as commentaries go, especially one involving epochal figures such
as Wittgenstein; thus with additional space opened by fewer endnotes, Cahill could have
more comprehensively developed a number of key points concerning his main thesis
and the implications drawn from them (see II below). The second point concerns the
tendency

of

Cahill’s

narrative

style

to

employ

various

modes

of

“dissertationese,” e.g., many instances of telling the reader in some detail what Cahill
intends to show and then, when the discussion is concluded, reminding the reader
of what has just been asserted. Cahill also frequently resorts to a “confessional”
stance which, although it might be authorially popular in some circles when writing
secondary sources, adds another layer of discourse not strictly germane to the content of
the argument. In one respect, these observations can be taken as minor concerns;
however, if the noted features were less dominant textually, there would have been
additional room for more substantive philosophical analysis and discussion.

II
“...no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind
in the power of names.”
(Cratylus, 440c)

The Wittgenstein scholar as well as a more casual reader examining Cahill’s book in
order to see what Wittgenstein may mean for contemporary philosophy—especially if
philosophy has been characterized as an inherently diverse and pluralistic enterprise—
will doubtless be engaged by the direction the book takes toward the history of
metaphysics and, according to Cahill, Wittgenstein’s systemic rejection of the collective
import of that history. Thus: “I try to make the case for thinking that Wittgenstein
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believed it possible to let go of the Western metaphysical tradition as one perhaps
necessary step in a process of a cultural transformation that was deeply important to
him” (152; cf.15, 36, 165, 169, 230n55).
Part II of this review offers a more detailed illustration of Cahill’s position in
this regard and also, if we grant the feasibility of his reading of Wittgenstein, raises a
series of questions concerning its theoretical cogency.

1. On the “Western Metaphysical Tradition”
Initially it is worth observing that “Western metaphysics” is a hybrid and readilyposited unity the analysis of which may well benefit from Wittgenstein’s own
injunction to “look and see” (§66) whether such an extensive and variegated history
does indeed display the unity that justifies naming it in this way. Does “Western
metaphysics,” if taken as a singular phenomenon, generate sufficient similarities to justify
identifying all the myriad and diverse practitioners of metaphysical thinking from
the pre-Socratics to the present as falling under a single rubric? Hegel, Heidegger and
Derrida were all prone to the same mode of assuming a single homogenized tradition
of metaphysics in its variegated entirety. But to take this tradition as a unity—i.e.,
as a diversified whole of many distinct parts—is surely as metaphysical a move as
any particular gesture, systematic or regional in scope, asserted within that tradition.
The question then becomes whether substantive consequences are available once a
philosophical student has imposed such a unity on 2,500 years of subtle and complex
reflection.
Consider, e.g., Aristotle (a philosopher Cahill claims Wittgenstein “hardly
read”—223n69), in particular the first page of the Categories (chapter 1 and the
beginning of chapter 2). Aristotle defines homonymy as the state of affairs when two
things, e.g., a man and a picture, share the same name. In his Clarendon Aristotle Series
translation, J. C. Ackrill comments (71): “it is important to recognize from the start that
the Categories is not primarily or explicitly about names, but about the things that
names signify.” In chapter 2, Aristotle then distinguishes between “things said”
singly or in combination—e.g., “man,” and “man runs.” If we stand back from what
has happened here, we observe that Aristotle has used, minimally stated, the
notions of being (or entity), referentiality and difference. Cahill’s approach to such
phenomena, following Wittgenstein, is very different: “If essence is expressed by
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grammar (§371), and if grammar tells you what kind of object anything is (§373), then
of course grammar tells you that pains, coins, and planets are essentially different in
their degree of independence from our grammar” (219n43). For Cahill, it appears that
grammar is the ultimate source of our realization that beings exist independently of
grammar—e.g., that “man” is a noun and “runs” is a verb, a difference justifying
the conclusion that the two designations are, as such, modes of reality existing apart
from grammatical distinctions. But for Aristotle, grammar is a reaction to and
reflection of more fundamental modes of awareness. After all, if humanity had evolved
without language or with language of a much more impoverished sort, then planets
would still have existed apart from our experience of these beings and our ability to
react to them.
If we look at the phenomena just introduced and describe what we see, which
position seems closer to the form of life in which these phenomena come to exist? For
example, do we perceive immediately the difference between a person and a picture or is
it necessary to examine grammar and then to determine how “difference” should be
derived from grammatical considerations in order justifiably to pronounce that the one
thing differs from the other thing—a person from a picture of that person, as well as a
person stationary from a person running?
Many similar questions arise if we reflect on the positions constituting
the history of metaphysics—the pre-Socratics through Whitehead and David Lewis—
from a Wittgensteinian perspective.

2. On “Forms of Life”
This is a crucial component in Wittgenstein’s approach to language and it is also an
especially vexed notion among his commentators. Cahill often appeals to the notion of
“form of life” (Lebensform) but seldom says what, in general, he thinks the concept
refers to. Perhaps the most explicit statement is the following: “A form of life is
constituted by common matters of concern that inform the shared actions and practices
that let us open up a common world, a common world, furthermore, in terms of which we
understand ourselves and our common matters of concern” (139; cf68). Cahill refers to
a “common world” in this account. Now “world” is, of course, a loaded metaphysical
term—Leibniz uses it when he characterizes the world we all dwell in as “the best of all
possible worlds.” Heidegger uses it via an interplay of “world” and “earth” in his
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exercise in ontological aesthetics, “The Origin of the Work of Art.” And it is a favorite
gambit of analytic philosophy in the construction of counter-examples (“consider a
world...”). One wonders then what Cahill has in mind with his usage of “world” as
an exegetical component of a crucial Wittgensteinian notion.
It is canonic Wittgenstein that once the senselessness of metaphysical
claims has been established, all that remains are “ordinary sentences.” These sentences
are the repository of scientific inquiry and investigation, presumably also of scientific
theorizing (cf. 60, 84, 85, 92, 95, 191n87). But these ordinary sentences also include
referentiality, i.e., designating certain beings for purposes of empirical observation and
at least the implicit preservation of differences between and among these beings.
Thus all the characteristics of metaphysical cast derived from the opening page of
Aristotle’s Categories also pertain to the “ordinary sentences” produced by the
sciences. The question then becomes the crucial matter of distinguishing between this
kind of “ordinary sentence” and parallel assertions displaying the same basic
characteristics. But however this distinction may be drawn, it seems necessary to
admit that any form of life—any “world” in the designated sense—must exist and
function in such a way as to allow access to words which “pick out” beings in the
world, thus establishing a fundamental relation between word and thing.
Bluntly stated, referentiality is a necessary condition for the establishment of
facts. Now if the words “picture” and “person” pick out distinct entities within a
given perceptual field, then a description of the underlying form of life will include (a)
two distinct entities within that field as well as (b) the fact of difference pertaining to
the juxtaposition of these two entities. If so, then the secondary and closely related
question becomes whether, when a metaphysician uses a word such as “entity” to
identify an element from within the form of life of ordinary perceptual experience, such
usage becomes as a matter of principle illegitimate prior to any specification of the
theoretical or abstract character of that thing as an element in a metaphysical theory.
The assumption here is that “form of life” can encompass a state of affairs
characterized by ordinary perception. If therefore this exemplification of a possible
form of life is incorrect, then we must devote more attention to Wittgenstein’s position
on reference, in particular whether reference understood as a neutral indicator of a
given being or entity is itself as replete with metaphysical underpinnings as more
explicitly “theoretical” aspects of language (e.g., the concept of meaning). This
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investigation must also show the distinction between reference when it functions as a
feature of an “ordinary sentence”—when presumably the ordinariness of such
sentences presupposes the capacity to refer to objects outside of language for purposes
of scientific scrutiny—and its counterpart as emergent from sentences when they occur
during the ordinary activities of daily life.

3. The Language Game of Wonder
Cahill contends that if jointly considered, Wittgenstein’s primary purpose in the
Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations was to instill a sense of wonder in the
reader and to do so with the understanding that western metaphysics, presumably
in its entirety, should not serve as a ladder standing as a source for perspective as far as
the pursuit of this sense of wonder is concerned. If so, is it then possible to identify what
prospective philosophers should be wondering about?
In the introduction, Cahill addresses this concern by stipulating that the soughtfor sense of wonder is aimed at what Wittgenstein felt “was the deeply mysterious
place of human life in the world” (2). So stated, it appears plausible to see
Wittgenstein wondering about how human life existed at all, thereby inspiring
additional reflection on the origins of our beginnings, a potentially religious area of
concern. But if “I wonder” could also have a more specific, limited object, then this
possible state of affairs seems to commit the individual wondering to a relation between (a)
whatever the condition of wonder entails on the side of the individual so characterized
and (b) the object of wonder—thus, I may wonder why anything exists, or why this
thing exists, or why this thing exists in this way.
Cahill refers to speaking “the language (game) of wonder” (96), the “wonder
language game” (148), and at one point to “a grammar of wonder” (147–48). These
locutions pitch the implementation of wonder within Wittgenstein’s later technical
vocabulary. How then would we proceed to involve ourselves with this language game if
it is aimed at the specifications just introduced? It seems that this question is not
readily answered. Thus: “Experience can teach [the philosopher] not only to become
more skillful at knowing where and how to look for relief from particular cases
of metaphysical confusion; it can also teach him to regard its occurrences with
skepticism and to begin to envisage the possibility and desirability of more radical
stances toward its sources” (166). Does Cahill give any indication how “more radical
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stances” might be understood, especially with respect to approaching the language game
of wonder? We sketch several possibilities suggested by Cahill’s own comments.
Wonder and Poetry. At 168, the penultimate page of the book, Cahill refers to
a tantalizing text from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: “What is more, Wittgenstein
acknowledges that the kind of project I am attributing to him here places him less in
the traditional role of the philosopher than in that of the poet....” Envisioning the
relevance of poetry to the philosophical enterprise recalls Heidegger, not the
Heidegger of Sein und Zeit (1927) but rather Heidegger years later, in Unterwegs zur
Sprache (1959) and Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (4th ed., 1971). In his
bibliography, Cahill lists twelve Heidegger primary sources (one is Poetry, Language,
Thought, a collection of seven essays, drawn from various works by Heidegger,
several of which concern language and poetry) but he asserts in the introduction that he
will only “gesture occasionally” to Heidegger’s later works “in footnotes or a turn of
phrase” (9). If one then wonders whether poets have anything important to say to
philosophers, an example of Cahill’s insistence on a “more radical stance” might be to
adopt the fundamental equality built into Heidegger’s pairing of Denken (thinking) and
Dichten (poetizing), and the senses in which Denken and Dichten derive from the
even more fundamental modes of language Heidegger identifies as Sagen (saying)
and Sprechen (speaking)—these distinctions all integral to Heidegger’s philosophy as
developed in the sources cited above.
To pursue poetry in its possible connection to wonder, it may become
necessary to rethink one of the main sources of expression for the poet—the
imagination. Cahill quotes (with approval) the following passage from the noted
Wittgenstein scholar Cora Diamond: the “propositions of the metaphysician...are the
result of a sort of disease of imagination, and the philosopher who comes out with them
lacks that understanding of himself which the Tractatus aims to secure for us” (36). This
is an exceptionally strong claim with respect to both its castigation of the imagination
when gone awry as well as the ascription of a self-delusional state possessing would-be
philosophers who are held captive by such imaginative excess. By contrast, consider
this passage from Whitehead’s Process and Reality (chapter 1, section II):
The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts
from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the
thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for
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renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. The
reason for the success of this method of imaginative rationalization
is that, when the method of difference fails, factors which are
consistently present may yet be observed under the influence of
imaginative thought.
For Diamond reading Wittgenstein, metaphysical assertions result from a diseased
imagination and the philosopher asserting such propositions suffers from a crucially
deficient self-understanding; for Whitehead, the imagination sets metaphysical
reflection soaring from observation of what is immediately around us into
generalizations which represent one of the finest achievements of civilization.
The stark difference in the two approaches compels additional close study of the
capacity of the originating function of human awareness. But the disputed nature of the
imagination to one side, the point is not that Cahill should have followed the lead of
his own appeal to a passage wherein Wittgenstein envisioned his philosophical efforts
as trading on the work of the poet and then, in this vein, introduced pertinent discussions
of Heidegger’s own efforts concerning poetic language; rather it is only that such texts
are available for consideration in order to determine whether existing philosophy, at
least as found in later Heidegger, can exhibit the greater degree of radicalness which
Cahill sees as implied by a serious response to Wittgenstein’s overall project.
Wonder and Technology. For Cahill, it is axiomatic that human beings begin to
use language within contexts wherein meaning and understanding are already determined
(cf.120, 121, 127). But one way in which contemporary speakers interact with language is
in terms of technology. However, the dominance of what Cahill has called “the
disengaged view”—an attitude which Wittgenstein sought to expose and undermine—
distorts our understanding of technology (among a number of other basic human
concerns): “the disengaged view in philosophy is one reflection of a lack of uncritical
assumption about and mythological demand on rationality that has often characterized
our culture’s thinking about progress in science, technology, economics, politics and
morals” (122). Is technology (to focus on one member of this list) and our relation to
technological processes and products a suitable goal of wondering in Cahill’s
technical sense?
Again, Heidegger thought so. But to wonder about technology presupposes
wondering about things, whether natural in origin or produced by human beings (or to
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both, especially in relation to one another). In this regard, Heidegger devoted considerable
attention to the notion of “thinghood.” Can human beings comport themselves with respect
to things in ways which do not necessarily result in the products of technology? In
Gelassenheit (1959) and Die Technik und die Kehre (2d. ed 1962), Heidegger offers guarded
recommendations to thoughtfully approaching this possibility.
I emphasize again: the fact that Cahill uses early Heidegger as part of his
interpretive machinery for reading Wittgenstein but explicitly excludes middle and
later Heidegger in his discussions is not the point. The point is that if philosophy
continues to exist as an activity of human concern, then it becomes incumbent to
determine (a) what we should be wondering about and (b) whether there are acceptable
and unacceptable approaches to such wondering. To suggest wondering about either
poetry or technology or both (following Cahill’s lead) is only a way into the
phenomenon in question—the “world” as Cahill has identified the ultimate locus of the
fundamental notion of a “form of life.” Only if such questions are raised and
addressed will it be possible to interact with Heidegger (or any thoughtful
individual) on the matters just introduced in order to determine his relevance to the
function and goal of wonder in philosophy.
Wonder and Metaphysics (Revisited). Wittgenstein’s Blue Book produces
an especially trenchant passage (154) as a prelude to a final thought on the object and
structure of wondering: “the undue influence of science in philosophy is the very source of
philosophical confusion. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does.
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into
complete darkness.”
But can those philosophically inclined evade the tendency to overextend the
effects of science and its methodologies, then derive insight and inspiration from other
sources? If so, could there be a language game, defined by its own inherent
predilections and drive for abstract constructions, called “metaphysics”? It will be
observed that the “craving for generality” (Wittgenstein’s phrase, quoted on 154) has been
realized in the texts of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Avicenna,
Maimonides, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Ayer, Russell,
Whitehead, Goodman, Lewis and on the current analytic scene, a group of energetic (and
typically youthful) philosophers self-labeled “metametaphysicians.” This list is, of
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course, not exhaustive. If Cahill’s reading of the progression of thought in Wittgenstein is
correct, then this “craving” has been misplaced from its inception. If, however, the
craving for generalities of metaphysical cast is as fundamental to at least some thoughtful
humans (endowed with exceptionally powerful speculative intellects) as that for food,
drink, sex, art, etc., has been for humans in general, then we must wonder whether the
Wittgensteinian notion of a “form of life” is sufficiently supple to include that kind of
living thought which pursues metaphysical projections and analyses. If so, then the
“craving for generality” becomes, from this perspective, just another form of life. If,
however, this conclusion so bluntly put is not tenable, then the foundational
element—“form of life”—must be analyzed and its theoretical and practical limits
drawn with much more precision than it has in Cahill’s book (as well as in descriptions
of the notion Cahill cites from other commentators).
Cahill has stressed that the “ethical point” of the Tractatus is a “change in the
reader’s self- understanding through a change in her relationship to language,” but
a change “characterized primarily by how we do or do not act, not by what we do
or do not know” (81). And again: “language permeates so many of our other
activities that it is arguable that the kind of alteration in one’s relation to it that I am
arguing Wittgenstein sought to bring about would result in a change in the way one
engaged in many of those activities as well” (199n130). Cahill comes down hard on the
lack of direction regarding such existential practicality contained in or even derivable
from the text of the Tractatus: “And so naturally too, then, nothing about virtues like
courage and openness being helpful for learning how to speak the language (game) of
wonder, something the book [i.e., the Tractatus] therefore converts from honest
difficulty to total incomprehensibility” (96).
How has Cahill determined that this sense of wonder requires “courage and
openness”? That issue of conceptual and relational origins aside, would questioning
the best way to understand courage, for example, assume that the accounts of this
virtue in Plato’s Laches or Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (book III, chapters 6–9) be
automatically stricken from consideration? Perhaps. For if wonder is a unique
phenomenon, then it could be argued that all virtues associated with wonder will be
commensurately unique. But even if such conceptual isolation were the case, it would
surely be useful heuristically to analyze Plato and Aristotle on courage just to determine
where these two great metaphysicians have erred in their presentations and conclusions.
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This kind of study will, or at least might, provide a sense of direction in order to excite
the appropriate dimensions of wonder. In sum, if courage as a virtue integrally
related to the exercise of wonder has even faint vestiges of metaphysicality in its
nature and operation, then it may be possible to play the language game of
metaphysics in order to grasp more adequately what we should be doing when we
wonder. But if the door is then open to the resumption of metaphysical thinking in this
guarded and circumscribed setting, it may be not only possible but eventually necessary
to restore and practice metaphysics to something like its prior position of, in Aristotle’s
phrase, “first philosophy” (Metaphysics 1004a4–6). The craving for this sort of
generality is a natural and inevitable consequence of humanity responding to its
place in the world, as the history of western metaphysics has so persistently and
powerfully demonstrated. From this perspective, such a craving is an especially basic
form of life.

III
If philosophy culminates in wonder but without a sense of foundation or direction other
than unspecified appeals to a “cultural transformation” and the need “to begin to
envisage the possibility and desirability of more radical stances toward its sources,”
then it becomes difficult to distinguish between (a) the potency of wonder—which in
antiquity begot Plato and Aristotle—and (b) skepticism, systemic silence which muffles
in principle any attempt to venture forth philosophically and confront the contemporary
world in all its complexity, dangers, and redemptive possibilities.
Cahill’s approach to Wittgenstein can be challenged if the reasons attributed to
justifying the primacy of wonder in Wittgenstein’s texts are found to be inadequate; in
this case, the more standard reading of Wittgenstein as providing philosophy with the
means for a kind of therapeutic cleansing of its argumentative excesses becomes more
attractive. The other alternative is to follow Cahill but then to recognize that this
approach requires its advocate (a) to engender new philosophical methods (in order to
produce new philosophical results, especially given the necessity to move “beyond”
anything metaphysical in its historical manifestations) or, eschewing the need for
methodological preparations, (b) to plunge ahead and philosophize in ways which
can be duly recognized as fundamentally different from the sequence of positions
comprising the entire Western metaphysical tradition. The difference between these
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alternatives is stark and dramatic.
It is a singular merit of Cahill’s book that if its thesis is seriously entertained,
the student of Wittgenstein must reexamine with care a variety of his basic texts in
order to demonstrate that Cahill’s reading is, in point of textual fact, without solid
and trustworthy foundation. We may conclude by observing, perhaps tentatively, that
with scant indication from Cahill concerning how to proceed if we believe that
philosophy can and should continue by preserving at least a measure of sameness with
regard to the practices of its heritage, we seem compelled to embrace the cryptic
conclusion of the Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent” (Cahill’s translation of the oft-quoted final sentence of the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus). But if philosophy properly characterized and understood
culminates in silence, then to whom should we listen for articulated wisdom when
confronting a complex and problematic world?

